Problem
Claude Code and other AI agents have predictable, safe command patterns that clawband repeatedly asks about — building binaries, running test suites, jq/python3 pipelines, heredoc config writes. These are standard AI-agent idioms, not risky user commands.
Proposed behaviour
Add a builtin_allow() tier (alongside builtin_deny and builtin_ask) of patterns that are known-safe in an AI coding agent context and should pass through silently without consulting user allow.patterns.
Example candidates:
cargo build, cargo test, cargo clippy, cargo fmt
python3 -c "import sys,json; ..." (visible inline code)
jq '.field' <<< '$VAR'
gh pr, gh issue, gh release commands
git log, git diff, git status, git fetch
Notes
- These should be conservative and specific — broad patterns risk suppressing genuinely risky commands
- User can override with their own
deny.patterns / ask.patterns
- Distinct from user
allow.patterns — these ship with the binary and represent Anthropic/maintainer judgment about AI agent safety
Problem
Claude Code and other AI agents have predictable, safe command patterns that clawband repeatedly asks about — building binaries, running test suites, jq/python3 pipelines, heredoc config writes. These are standard AI-agent idioms, not risky user commands.
Proposed behaviour
Add a
builtin_allow()tier (alongsidebuiltin_denyandbuiltin_ask) of patterns that are known-safe in an AI coding agent context and should pass through silently without consulting user allow.patterns.Example candidates:
cargo build,cargo test,cargo clippy,cargo fmtpython3 -c "import sys,json; ..."(visible inline code)jq '.field' <<< '$VAR'gh pr,gh issue,gh releasecommandsgit log,git diff,git status,git fetchNotes
deny.patterns/ask.patternsallow.patterns— these ship with the binary and represent Anthropic/maintainer judgment about AI agent safety