Summary
openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (r.URL.Path) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (%2e) and separators (%2f) were decoded to ../ and / before reaching the local service.
Go's ServeMux rejects literal ../ paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization.
Example:
/%2e%2e/secret.txt → file outside web root/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd → sensitive files
Encoded slashes (/a%2fb) could also bypass path-based access controls.
Fix
v0.1.2 forwards r.URL.EscapedPath() on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client.
Users should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.
References
Summary
openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (
r.URL.Path) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (%2e) and separators (%2f) were decoded to../and/before reaching the local service.Go's ServeMux rejects literal
../paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal.Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization.
Example:
/%2e%2e/secret.txt→ file outside web root/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd→ sensitive filesEncoded slashes (
/a%2fb) could also bypass path-based access controls.Fix
v0.1.2 forwards
r.URL.EscapedPath()on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client.Users should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.
References