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Tamper Resistance did not protect the SQLite auxiliary files belonging to Santa's rule database

Moderate
mlw published GHSA-5gx7-x227-g2fv Aug 4, 2026

Software

santa

Affected versions

<= 2026.6

Patched versions

2026.7

Description

Summary

Santa's Tamper Resistance protected its databases by pathname, covering each database file but not the auxiliary files SQLite maintains alongside it for transactions and crash recovery.

A process already running as root could place its own content in one of those files. SQLite treats them as part of the database's state, so the next time santad opened the database it consumed that content during normal recovery and applied it to the protected database, under santad's own trusted context and without any operation ever targeting the protected pathname. Restricting who may write a database file is not sufficient when another file can commit changes into it.

Root is a prerequisite. Tamper Resistance is a defense-in-depth control intended to hold up against a hostile root, so failing to hold that line is a real defect even though root is required.

Impact

An attacker with local root could:

  • Change the enforcement state of an existing rule. A binary that policy blocked could be turned into an allow, and a binary that policy allowed could be turned into a block. This was validated end to end. After an ordinary reboot the modified state was present in the database and Santa enforced it, including in Lockdown mode.
  • Destroy local policy state, causing Santa to discard the rule database and start from an empty one.

The change persists across reboot and requires no further attacker action once established.

The reporter did not test, and this advisory does not claim, insertion of entirely new rules, modification of non-binary rule identities, or effects on CEL or compiler policy.

Detection and recovery

For deployments backed by a sync service, this tampering is detectable and recoverable rather than silent. Santa reports a hash of its rule database to the sync server on each sync. A server that compares this against its own view of the client's expected policy will observe the drift and can require a clean sync, which replaces local rules with authoritative server state.

The same caveats as elsewhere apply:

  • It is detection and recovery, not prevention. Modified policy is enforced from the moment it takes effect until the next sync reconciles it.
  • It depends on the sync server actually comparing the reported hash and acting on a mismatch. Workshop does this automatically, with no configuration required. Other sync servers vary.
  • It does not apply to standalone deployments that are not backed by a sync service, where there is no authoritative copy to reconcile against.

What changes in 2026.7

The SQLite auxiliary files alongside Santa's protected databases are now restricted the same way the databases are. Only santad may read or modify them.

Tools that previously read those files, such as backup or inventory processes copying Santa's state directory, will now be denied on them, as they already were on the databases themselves.

Affected versions

Field Value
Affected Santa <= 2026.6
Fixed in Santa 2026.7
Severity Medium, CVSS v4.0 base score 6.8
CVSS CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-284: Improper Access Control, CWE-353: Missing Support for Integrity Check

Mitigation

Upgrade to Santa 2026.7 or later. There is no configuration-level workaround in affected versions.

The following are compensating controls that reduce exposure until you can upgrade. None of them close the underlying issue.

  • Limit who can become root. Exploitation requires pre-existing root, so restricting administrative access reduces the population that can attempt it. Workshop customers can use Endpoint Privilege Management to constrain user elevation to root. This narrows the set of users who can reach the required privilege. It does not help against an attacker who obtains root by another route, such as a separate privilege-escalation flaw or an already-root process.
  • Verify sync-side drift detection. Operators running their own sync server should confirm they compare the rule hash reported by clients against expected policy and require a clean sync on mismatch. Workshop does this automatically.
  • Watch for unexpected changes to Santa's state directory.

Credit

Reported by OpenAI Codex Security, Jamie Brim (@jamieb-oai).

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required High
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Learn more on MITRE.

Missing Support for Integrity Check

The product uses a transmission protocol that does not include a mechanism for verifying the integrity of the data during transmission, such as a checksum. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits